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Abstract  
This paper examines two drastic changes in the performance of local water 
associations in providing local public goods – appropriate levels of water table – in 
the reclamation system in the Powiat Pyrzyce in the Voivodship Zachodniopomorski 
in northwest Poland. Employing an institutional economics approach shows the 
results of processes of revalorisation of the interrelated property objects land and 
reclamation infrastructure that have been triggered and shaped not only by the drastic 
political, economic and administrative changes after the breakdown of the socialist 
regime in Poland in 1990, but also by the prospect of joining the European Union 
and the proactive leadership of the director of the Powiat Department of 
Environmental Protection, Forestry and Agriculture. More precisely, both processes 
– the discontinuation (from 1990 onwards) and revival (from 2002 onwards) of the 
local water associations – were mainly determined by changing market conditions 
together with variances in the ability of state authorities to effectively control and 
facilitate these associations. Further, the delay in overcoming the period of collective 
inaction was fostered by the time-delayed and cumulative effects of neglecting the 
cleaning and the maintenance of secondary ditches. 
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Agricultural production depends on the management of the natural resources land and 
water. In many regions with naturally high water tables, various forms of drainage or 
reclamation infrastructure have been applied to provide water tables that allow for 
(efficient) agricultural land use. These reclamation infrastructures are hydro-melioration 
systems that usually consist of networks of canals, ditches and subsurface tiles that 
collect, transport and dispose of gravitational water from soil. This agricultural land 
drainage eliminates or mitigates the adverse effects of excess soil moisture on crops and 
cropping operations. Thus, crop yields are usually higher, and costs and risks of farm 
management are reduced, on drained soils (SPALING and SMIT 1995). Further, these 
systems of secondary (small) and primary (large) arterial drains are often equipped with 
weirs and pumping stations that enable irrigation by flood or infiltration. With these 
facilities, the water table can be regulated, excessive water runoff can be avoided and 
the risk of droughts in summer can be reduced.  
 
In this paper, reclamation infrastructures are conceived of as typical examples of rural 
infrastructures that provide various forms of public goods (OSTROM et al. 1993). As well 
as flood protection, they also provide more spatially restricted (i.e. local) public goods: 
‘appropriate’ levels of soil moisture and water tables conducive for agricultural land use. 
Actors farming outside the reclaimed area are technically excluded from this local public 
good. Access to the benefits of the reclamation system is only possible if an actor has – 
at least – use rights on land within the reclaimed area. In turn, it is technically hardly 
feasible to exclude actors farming land within the reclaimed area, thus, they may have 
incentives to free-ride which can lead to under-investment in the provision and 
maintenance of reclamation infrastructures (SCHEUMANN and FREISEM 2001). Due to the 
technical interdependence of the reclamation infrastructure, insufficiently cleaned 
segments of the network of ditches can severely hamper water runoff for larger parts of 
the reclaimed area. This can result in local spots of land with excessive soil moisture that 
are not restricted to the land in the immediate vicinity of the poorly cleaned ditch.  
 
Some form of collective action and coordination between the actors within the reclaimed 
area is necessary to ensure the provision of appropriate levels of this local public good. 
Despite theoretical scepticism about the ability of self-interested individuals to 
coordinate collective action for providing public goods (OLSON 1965), there is 
substantial empirical evidence that various forms of local self-organised resource 
governance systems are indeed able to reduce the probability of free-riding and to 
manage common resources sustainably (OSTROM 1990). While there are many studies 
focusing on collective action within commonly managed irrigation systems (e.g. 
OSTROM 1992), there is only a small body of research addressing collective action and 
property regimes within reclamation or drainage systems (e.g. SCHEUMANN and FREISEM 
2001; PANT 2002).  
 
In this paper, the reclamation system in the Powiat (district) Pyrzyce, in the Voivodship 
(Poland’s largest administrative unit) Zachodniopomorski in northwest Poland, which 
has to a large extent been managed by local water associations, is examined. Two drastic 
changes in the performance of the local water associations in providing the local public 
good – appropriate levels of water table – observed since 1990 are presented and 
analysed:  
 
1. The discontinuation from 1990 onwards of the activities of the local water 
  2associations, which led to neglect of the secondary reclamation infrastructure.  
 
2. The revival of the local water associations from 2002 onwards. 
 
Section 2 introduces the concept of property rights and governance structures and relates 
it to the specific context of reclamation systems. In Section 3, the empirical research 
methodology and the research region, the Powiat Pyrzyce, is presented, focusing on the 
development of land use and reclamation infrastructure until 1990, the distribution of 
property rights among actors, and the governance structures in place. Section 4 presents 
and analyses two drastic changes in the performance of the local water associations in 
producing the local public good that could be observed since 1990. Finally, Section 5 
summarises and discusses the results.  
2 PROPERTY RIGHTS, GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES AND RECLAMATION 
SYSTEMS  
In this paper, an institutional economics perspective is taken to analyse the determinants 
of the rural changes observed. Here, property rights are conceived of as bundles of rights 
and duties (e.g. SCHLAGER and OSTROM 1992). In agricultural production systems, 
property rights on land are often correlated with other property objects that constitute 
different social relationships (LASCHEWSKI and PENKER 2009). Reclamation systems 
usually consist of the main property objects ‘land’ and ‘reclamation infrastructure’, 
while the latter can be further divided into its components canals, ditches, subsurface 
drainage tiles, weirs and pumping stations.  
 
Rights and duties related to the various property objects – and, thus, the involved benefit 
streams and costs for meeting the connected obligations – can be assigned to the very 
same actor or actor group, or they can rest with different social actors. In particular in 
the latter case, suitable governance structures are necessary to make property rights 
effective, since individual land users within a reclaimed area may be tempted to neglect 
their duties to avoid the costs involved. Similarly, neighbouring farmers may be 
deprived of their benefits from the reclamation infrastructure if some farmers free-ride 
and do not stand up for their duties. Overall, the distribution of de facto property rights 
on any property object within the reclamation system and the ability of the governance 
structures in place to enforce the related rights and duties (de)motivate the economic 
decisions of individual actors to engage in collective action. This is because they 
determine the – admittedly subjective – actors’ expectations about the actual costs and 
benefits of their decisions.  
3 THE RECLAMATION SYSTEM IN PYRZYCE UNTIL 1990  
This paper is based on empirical material collected in the Voivodship 
Zachodniopomorski in northwest Poland, largely in the Powiat Pyrzyce. Here, 12 
qualitative, semi-structured interviews were conducted, among others, with farmers, 
representatives of the agricultural and the reclamation administration at Voivodship, 
Powiat and Gmina (municipality) level, and members of the local water associations. 
Moreover, legal documents and regional statistics were consulted.  
3.1 Land use and reclamation infrastructure  
Pyrzyce is a flat agricultural region with a large number of small lakes, ponds and rivers 
that covers 726 km
2 and is situated about 50 km southeast of Szczecin, the main city in 
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the political and economic transition period, around 1990, state-owned agricultural firms 
(PGRs) were farming about 52% (30,000 ha) of agricultural land in the region; the rest 
(about 27,000 ha) was used by a very high number (ca. 2,000) of small family farms. In 
contrast to most other Central and Eastern European countries, a dual farm structure 
(state and private) developed during socialist times in Poland; private family farms 
continued to have a substantial share in agricultural production.  
 
In the PGRs in Pyrzyce, intensive livestock production (pigs and cattle) was the 
dominant form of agricultural production. Agricultural land was mainly used for 
intensive grassland farming and for growing maize, cereals and sugar beet to ensure a 
sufficient supply of animal fodder. However, mixed farming (crops and livestock) was 
also characteristic for the family farms in the region. Soil quality can be classified as 
good to very good.  
 
Reclamation activities in Pyrzyce started as early as 1300 and were intensified during 
the 17th/18th century by the building of many of today’s primary canals and ditches. 
During socialist times, in particular since the 1960s, the network of secondary ditches 
and subsurface tiles was extended greatly. About 90% of the land farmed by the PGRs 
was reclaimed, while this was only the case for about 50% of the family farmland. By 
1990, there were about 900 km of canals, ditches and subsurface tiles (of which 600 km 
are secondary) that drained 30,000 ha of agricultural land; of which 20,000 ha were 
arable lands.
 
This system of canals and ditches was also equipped with many weirs and 
nine pumping stations to enable irrigation by flood and even by infiltration, if necessary.  
3.2 Property rights and governance structures  
While family farms usually farmed own land, PGRs exclusively farmed state-owned 
land. Building of the reclamation infrastructure had been – largely – centrally planned by 
the state; yet, building of secondary ditches and subsurface tiles was not compulsory for 
family farmers. Only if farmers in a village felt the need for land drainage they founded 
a village water association that coordinated the building activities with state authorities. 
Specialised state-owned reclamation firms would then construct the drainage works. 
This was mainly financed by the members of the village water association themselves, 
but co-financed by the state.  
 
Secondary ditches, subsurface tiles and weirs on family farmland were private property 
of the owners of the (bordering) land, coming along with the legal responsibility to 
maintain and clean ditches and subsurface tiles on a regular basis and to maintain and 
operate weirs. Practically, these activities were usually carried out by specialised state-
owned enterprises assigned by the village water associations. Here, farmers who were 
members of the respective water associations paid small fees according to the length of 
ditches and subsurface tiles on their land. Starting in the 1970s, all village water 
associations in a municipality, Gmina, merged to form larger local (or Gmina) water 
associations. Furthermore, in 1986, all six local water associations in the region – which 
later (in 1999) became the Powiat Pyrzyce – organised under the roof of an umbrella 
association (związek spółek wodnych). Here, a general manager (honorary post), an 
accountant and a small technical team were supposed to coordinate the activities of the 
local water associations in the region as well as to collect the farmers’ fees.  
 
Unlike the secondary ditches and weirs, primary canals and ditches as well as primary 
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and maintenance of the ditches, and maintenance and operation of the weirs and 
pumping stations were planned and organised by respective state authorities at 
Voivodship level and the respective regional branch office. Specialised state-owned 
reclamation enterprises carried out all these activities.  
4 PROCESSES OF CHANGE IN THE RECLAMTION SYSTEM IN PYRZYCE 
AFTER 1990  
In this section, two drastic changes in the performance of the local water associations in 
the Powiat Pyrzyce in producing the local public good – appropriate levels of water table 
– observed since 1990 are presented and analysed:  
 
1.  The discontinuation from 1990 onwards of the cleaning and maintenance activities at 
secondary ditches and subsurface tiles of the local water associations.  
 
2.  The revival of the local water associations and their resumption of cleaning activities 
at secondary ditches and subsurface tiles from about 2002 onwards.  
 
Since local water associations have only been active on family farmland, developments 
in the formerly state-owned areas are largely excluded from the subsequent analysis.  
4.1 Discontinuing activities of local water associations after 1990  
From about 1990 onwards, the local water associations in Pyrzyce largely suspended 
cleaning and maintenance activities at secondary ditches and subsurface tiles. The 
liberalisation of food prices (1989) and prices for goods and services (1990) together 
with the abolition of input-related subsidies (1991) resulted in a systematic decline of 
agricultural production in Poland and severely worsened the agricultural terms of trade. 
In particular, there was a strong decline in cattle numbers and milk production, reflecting 
the shrinking demand for milk products as a consequence of the declining real incomes 
of major social groups in Poland and the abolition of food subsidies, which led to higher 
consumer prices. While part of this decline was due to the process of liquidation of 
PGRs that began in 1990 and the resulting drastic reduction in agricultural production, 
the development in private family farms followed the same trend. In 1990/91, for 
example, private family farms in Poland suffered an overall income loss of about 60%, 
which was only partly compensated by a higher non-agricultural income (OECD 1995).  
 
Despite these developments, the structure, size and number of family farms in Pyrzyce 
remained rather stable after 1990. Presently (2005), there are more than 2,200 family 
farms, of which about 22% are classified as semi-subsistence and subsistence farms, 
farming more than 61% of the agricultural land in the Powiat. Many farms still practise 
mixed farming (crops and livestock), although a growing number of larger family farms 
specialise in crop farming. Cereals (wheat, rye and barley) are the dominant crops, but 
triticale, potatoes and sugar beet are also grown (MAJEWSKI 2005). The drastic decline 
of animal production was considered by all interviewed actors as the main reason that 
led to a revalorisation of the property object land. As a consequence, a significant share 
of the grassland in the region was either turned into arable land since crop farming had 
become more profitable or, more often, was simply abandoned. In particular in the latter 
case, drainage of these large plots of land was hardly needed anymore and most farmers 
stopped paying their fees.  
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In 1990, the control and facilitation of the activities of the local water associations were 
transferred to the regional state administrations (urzędy rejonowe). Yet, control and 
enforcement was hardly active. Reportedly, this often resulted in representatives of local 
water associations taking the family farmers’ fees, but not carrying out any cleaning. To 
some extent, this lack of effective control and support was due to limited financial 
resources and a shortage of competent personnel available at the communal level but 
also due to some remaining ambiguities concerning the (new) distribution of – in 
particular financial – responsibilities for reclamation issues between the regional state 
administrations, the Gminas, local water associations and the state water administration.  
 
At the same time, there was only very limited political interest in reclamation issues. The 
state budget for maintaining and cleaning primary canals and ditches has been reduced 
drastically since 1990 (OECD 1995). Many primary canals and ditches were only 
cleaned every third year, or even less often. In 2005, for example, the budget of the 
regional branch of the state water administration in Pyrzyce was only sufficient to ensure 
the professional cleaning and maintenance of 4-18 km, i.e. only up to 6% of all primary 
canals in the Powiat. By and large, cleaning activities on secondary ditches and 
subsurface tiles became largely ineffective since the water drained from the soils could 
not flow freely in the primary arterial drains. This effect was exacerbated by the almost 
non-existent coordination between local water associations and the state water 
administration.  
 
Apart from these market and state authority related factors, the interviews highlighted 
another important determinant that contributed to the long duration (over one decade) of 
inactivity of the local water associations. This factor relates to a specific feature of 
drainage systems, i.e. that neglect of cleaning and maintenance activities does not 
necessarily cause flooding problems in the short run. Ditches and subsurface tiles only 
gradually lose their ability to transport excess water. Thus, due to a succession of dry 
summers in the 1990s the decreasing ability of secondary ditches to reduce soil moisture 
was not perceived as a problem.  
 
It is argued that the first two factors together – (1) changing market conditions and the 
abolition of input-related subsidies, which resulted in the abandonment of most of the 
remaining grassland plots, and (2) the inability of the state authorities to effectively 
control and facilitate the activities of the local water associations and to enforce the 
formal property rights on secondary reclamation infrastructures – were the main driving 
forces in this process. Both factors complemented each other in significantly altering the 
level of benefits farmers could expect to derive from respective property objects and 
from a well-functioning reclamation infrastructure and, thus, from their individual 
contributions. These primary factors were exacerbated by the insufficient cleaning of 
primary canals. Further, the time-delayed and cumulative effects of neglecting the 
cleaning and maintenance of ditches have also reduced actors’ incentives to contribute to 
the provision of the local public good. 
4.2 Revitalising local water associations from 2002 onwards  
From about 2002 onwards, more and more local water associations in Pyrzyce were 
revitalised, and cleaning activities at secondary ditches and subsurface tiles were 
resumed. Probably, most important was an administrative reform in Poland in 1999 that 
introduced Powiats as intermediate units – between Gminas and Voivodships – of local 
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country was reduced from 49 to 16. In the course of the administrative reform, 
administrative responsibility for secondary reclamation infrastructure and, thus, also the 
control and facilitation of the activities of local water associations was transferred to the 
head (Starosta) of the newly created and more potent Powiat administrations. In the 
Powiat Pyrzyce, the director of the Powiat Department of Environmental Protection, 
Forestry and Agriculture has indeed been very active in tackling the reclamation 
problems in the region. Among other things, he succeeded in convincing many farmers 
to revive the local water associations. In some Gminas, farmers elected new 
representatives and started to pay their fees again.  
 
From the perspective of the Powiat administration, encouraging and supporting local 
water associations to organise cleaning activities at secondary infrastructures was the 
most convenient and efficient way to guarantee effective drainage. The alternative would 
have been to enforce the obligations directly at the level of the individual farmers. Given 
the sheer number as well as the limited and very heterogeneous capabilities of individual 
family farmers in the region, this approach would not have guaranteed effective 
drainage. Starting in 2004, the director also initiated cooperation with the local 
employment centre in the context of a state programme to reintegrate long-term 
unemployed people: the employment centre pays the salaries for teams of workers that 
have started to maintain and clean secondary ditches. In turn, the Powiat administration 
together with the respective local water associations coordinates and supervises the work 
and provides the technical equipment. Furthermore, cleaning activities at secondary 
ditches are closely coordinated with the regional state water administration and its 
respective activities at primary canals.  
 
Two other factors need to be mentioned. First, while the general agricultural terms of 
trade did not improve much until 2005 (EC 2002), Poland’s accession to the European 
Union (EU) in 2004 and integration into the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
substantially changed the market conditions and also the ways of generating farm 
income for the family farmers. In this context, the EU premiums paid to farmers for the 
extensive use of grassland were often mentioned in the interviews as a strong incentive 
to start using the formerly abandoned grassland plots; cutting the grass on those plots at 
least once per year is compulsory. Due to this revalorisation of the property object land, 
drainage regained importance since related farming operations are only possible if there 
is no excess soil moisture. Second, although the state budget available for cleaning and 
maintaining primary canals was not increased, several EU co-financed programmes to 
take care of necessary activities for rural infrastructures had recently been initiated. This 
is expected to allow for an intensification of cleaning activities at primary canals, which 
in turn would make individual contributions to keep secondary ditches clean more 
worthwhile.  
 
Further, the revival of the local water associations has also been triggered by a 
succession of rainy summers that caused widespread flooding since many secondary 
ditches and subsurface tiles had become totally dysfunctional. 
 
All in all, the formal and effective change in authority to control and facilitate the 
reclamation activities in Pyrzyce increased the farmers’ readiness to stand up for their 
own duties with respect to the secondary infrastructure. This process was facilitated 
substantially by the active support of the head of the responsible department within the 
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if one takes into account that the revival of local water associations has not been 
successful in many other Powiats in the same Voivodship. Further, the market-related 
changes and the introduction of the CAP that followed Poland’s accession to the EU, 
leading to a revalorisation of the property object land, also fostered the process of 
revalorisation of the property object secondary reclamation infrastructure 
5 CONCLUSIONS  
In this paper, two drastic changes in the performance of local water associations in 
providing local public goods – appropriate levels of water table – in the reclamation 
system in the Powiat Pyrzyce in the Voivodship Zachodniopomorski in northwest 
Poland were presented and analysed. Both processes – the discontinuation (from 1990 
onwards) and revival (from 2002 onwards) of the local water associations – were mainly 
determined by market-related changes, alterations in the structure and performance of 
state administrations and specific characteristics of the resource system. It was argued 
that changing market conditions and the abolition of input-related subsidies that resulted 
in the abandonment of most grassland plots, together with the inability of the state and 
communal authorities to effectively control and facilitate the activities of the local water 
associations and to enforce the formal property rights on secondary reclamation 
infrastructures were the main driving forces for the deterioration of collective action. 
These primary factors were exacerbated by the insufficient cleaning of primary canals by 
the state water administration. In turn, the process of revitalisation of local water 
associations from 2002 onwards was facilitated by the formal and effective transfer of 
the authority to control and facilitate the reclamation activities in Pyrzyce to the Powiat 
administration as well as by market-related changes and the introduction of the CAP that 
followed Poland’s accession to the EU. Further, the process of revitalisation was also 
positively triggered by the pro-active leadership of a key actor, the director of the Powiat 
Department of Environmental Protection, Forestry and Agriculture. Finally, it was found 
that the time-delayed and cumulative effects of neglecting the cleaning and maintenance 
of secondary ditches fostered the delay in overcoming the period of collective inaction.  
 
These findings are in line with a growing body of scholarly work arguing for a stronger 
and more differentiated emphasis on factors determining the external environment, or 
context, for understanding (dis)incentives for actors to cooperate and to engage in 
collective action for natural resource management, and for a more detailed account of 
the physical features of the respective natural and technical resource systems (e.g. 
AGRAWAL 2001; OSTROM 2009). In addition, leadership has been identified as a key 
factor in collective action situations by many other authors. Here, competent and 
charismatic leaders and key actors can foster cooperation (e.g. MEINZEN-DICK 2007; 
HURRELMANN et al. 2006; MARELLI 2009); yet, ‘bad leadership’ may also have 
destructive effects (e.g. THEESFELD 2009). Investigating the role of these factors proves 
to be particularly important in post-socialist countries where transition processes are 
characterised by fast, substantial and often simultaneous changes of many elements of 
the economic, social, administrative and political context (e.g. THEESFELD 2004; SIKOR 
2006) and where similar processes of revalorisation in reclamation systems can also be 
observed (e.g. SCHLEYER 2004).  
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